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I Introduction
 There is no question that warfare can be seriously disruptive to the environment, and 
the environment continues to be ‘the silent victim of armed conflicts.’1） Considering that 
 ＊ Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Kansai University
 1） The United Nations Environment Programme (hereinafter, UNEP), Protecting the Environment During 
13
most armed conflicts today are non-international or civil wars, much of the existing legal 
framework of international law does not necessarily apply. Despite growing concern on 
the issue, environmental harm in times of non-international armed conflicts is still an 
underestimated consequence of the hostilities.
 It is obvious that many weapons have great potential to cause serious and lasting 
damage to the environment 2）. Forests are most frequently targeted in armed conflict as they 
provide natural cover and camouflage for non-state armed groups in addition to ‘food, 
water, fuel, and medicine.’3） Wildlife is also an important element of the natural 
environment that often faces danger in the context of non-international armed conflicts 4）. It 
is clear that the exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can 
become significant drivers of violence and non-international armed conflicts in the first 
place 5）. However, resource exploitation per se is not the main concern that the laws of 
armed conflict were designed for 6）.
 Though some regulations of the laws of armed conflict apply to some situations, this 
does not always mean that the environment is protected during all categories of armed 
conflict 7）. Not all rules applicable in relation to international armed conflict are considered 
applicable during non-international armed conflicts, even though the consequences of 
environmental harm remain the same in both cases 8）. The environment itself was not even 
recognized in international documents regulating conduct in armed conflict until 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 9）. Despite the realization of an urgent 
need to regulate protection of the environment during armed conflicts, however, it was left 
to a set of norms, such as Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, and there was 
Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (Switzerland: UNEP, 2009), 4.
 2） Ibid., 13.
 3） Wil De Jong, Deanna Donovan and Ken-ichi Abe (eds), Extreme Conflict and Tropical Forests (Springer, 
2007), 1.
 4） Joseph P. Dudley and others, “Effects of War and Civil Strife on Wildlife and Wildlife Habitats,” 
Conservation Biology, Vol.16 (2002), 319. For example, the widespread placement of the land mines had 
threatened the lives of the mountain gorillas in the Rwandan Civil War: see Jessica C Lawrence & Kevin Jon 
Heller, “The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute: The First Ecocentric Environmental War 
Crime,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol.20 (2007), 85.
 5） UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (Nirobi: 
UNEP, 2009), 8.
 6） In a certain situation, opportunistic looting and exploitation of resources in the context of an armed conflict 
may be covered by the prohibition against pillage.
 7） For a comprehensive discussion on the classification of armed conflict, see Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.), 
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University Press, 2012).
 8） Rogier Bartels, “Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide 
between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol.91, 
No.873 (2009), 35-67.
 9） Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), adopted 8 June 1977.
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criticism of the high threshold of applicability of Additional Protocol I 10）. It is generally 
acknowledged by most commentators that legal regulation tends to be insufficient on this 
matter 11）.
 Under Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 194912）, 
non-international armed conflicts are armed conflicts in which one or more non-state 
armed groups are involved. Depending on the situation, hostilities may occur between 
governmental armed forces and non-state armed groups or between such groups only. In 
the case of Tadić, the ICTY concluded that while an international conflict encompasses just 
about any amount of violence between two states, a non-international armed conflict 
consists in “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State” 13）. Environmental damage as a result 
of the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts has been less frequently 
highlighted. The purpose of this article is to reflect on the question of whether the current 
legal framework relevant to non-international armed conflicts is providing adequate 
protection of the environment by analysing if there are any explicit or implicit obligations 
dispersed in written or customary law that may contribute to this. The problems of the 
possible legal vacuum and the lack of an existing legal framework for the issue will be 
examined in terms of the direct and indirect regulation of the protection of the 
environment in non-international armed conflicts.
10） Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, “International Law Protecting the 
Environment during Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol.92 
(2010), 576-578. Alexandre Kiss, “International Humanitarian Law and the Environment”, Environmental 
Policy and Law, Vol.31 (2001), 223-231.
11） Wil D. Verwey, “Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: In Search of a New Legal 
Perspective,” Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol.29 (1995); Hans-Peter Gasser, “For Better Protection 
of Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: A Proposal for Action,” American Journal of International Law, 
Vol.89 (1995), 637-643; Carl E. Bruch, “Introduction,” Environmental Consequences of War. Legal, Economic 
and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43.
12） Common Article 3 refers to Article 3, which is common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
(First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Art 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, Art 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 Art 3; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287 Art 3.
13） Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Case No IT-94-1, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 70.
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II	 Treaty-based	Laws	of	Non-international	Armed	Conflicts	and	Protection	
of the Environment
 This chapter presents and discusses the existing available law that developed within 
International Law. The law of armed conflict is mostly concerned with conflicts between 
states. However, it is widely accepted that the law of armed conflicts applies, to some 
extent, to non-international armed conflicts as well. Regarding treaty law, Additional 
Protocol II14） and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which regulate 
non-international armed conflict, do not contain any provisions which offer direct 
protection of the environment.
1. 1949 Geneva Conventions and their protocols
1.1. Common Article 3
 Common Article 3 was the first provision in the laws of armed conflict to identify 
non-international armed conflict as a category of armed conflict in its own right 15）. 
Common Article 3 applies to all armed conflicts that are not covered by Common Article 
2 of the four Geneva Conventions 1949. An armed conflict regulated by Common Article 
3 may be a conflict between a state and a non-state armed group or, alternatively, a 
non-international armed conflict may arise between two non-state actors on the territory of 
a state. This provision has been suggested as a means of indirectly prohibiting 
environmental damage in non-international armed conflict 16）. It contains ‘a set of minimum 
standards of humane treatment to be adhered to in all circumstances.’17）
 Bruch has observed that certain instances of environmental warfare may cause violence 
to life and person, and this would violate Article 3(l)(a)18）. He argued that this is only to 
the extent that the anthropocentric standards apply, as Common Article 3 does not 
mention environmental damage in general.
1.2.	Additional	Protocol	II
 Additional Protocol II is generally regarded to be ‘a considerable improvement on 
Common Article 3’19） as it has more detailed and specific provisions. Despite the absence 
14） Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of War 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), adopted 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
15） Jelena Pejic, “The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye,” International Review 
of the Red Cross, Vol.93 (2011), 189.
16） Aurelie Lopez, “Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage Occurring in Times of Non-International 
Armed Conflict: Rights and Remedies,” Fordham Environmental Law Review, Vol.18 (2006-2007), 240.
17） Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), 59.
18） Carl E. Bruch, “All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal 
Armed Conflict,” Vermont Law Review, Vol.25 (2000-2001), 709-710.
19） Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, “Minimum 
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of explicit rules of environmental protection in Additional Protocol II, there are some 
provisions available for the protection of the environment. Firstly, the provision of 
protection of ‘property’ of Additional Protocol II may contribute to the protection of the 
environment. Secondly, provisions existing to protect civilians may have a similar effect.
It is difficult to include all the components of the environment, such as the atmosphere, 
ecological concepts, ecosystems and biological diversity, under this category of the 
protection of property as some elements of the environment can be classified as private 
property or public property 20）. Nonetheless, indirect prohibitions on environmental damage 
may be ascertained by considering elements of the environment to be protected property.
 The most promising provision in the Geneva Conventions, in terms of its scope of 
application to natural resource exploitation, may be the prohibition on pillage. Pillage was 
included as subject to prohibition in the context of international armed conflict. It was also 
included in Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II, ensuring its continued application in 
non-international armed conflict. By recognizing natural-resource exploitation as a 
property-based act of armed conflict, nonetheless, it can be forbidden by the prohibition 
on pillage in certain circumstances 21）.
 Article 14 prohibits attacks against foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking-water installations and supplies and irrigation works, 
items that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population 22）. In terms of the 
protection of the environment, this provision has the limitation that the protection of 
certain environmental elements has linkage to the ultimate result of the starvation of the 
civilian population.
 Article 15 prohibits attacks against potentially dangerous installations, such as dams, 
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, if an attack may cause the release of 
dangerous forces that cause severe losses among the civilian population 23）. Article 56 of 
Additional Protocol I has three military-exception clauses which permit the targeting of 
these installations 24）, but no such exceptions in Article 15 of Additional Protocol II. This 
means that there is broader protection for these kinds of installations, thus greater 
protection for the environment in non-international armed conflict. These provisions are 
aimed at protecting the civilian population; nonetheless, the environmental impact of the 
provisions is also evident.
Humanitarian Standards,” analytical report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 1997/21, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/87 5 January 1998, para 77.
20） Daniella Dam-de Jong, “International Law and Resource Plunder: The Protection of Natural Resources 
during Armed Conflict,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Vol.19 (2008), footnotes 113.
21） Michael A. Lundberg, “The Plunder of Natural Resources During War: A War Crime (?),” Georgetown 
Journal of International Law, Vol.39 (2007-2008), 502.
22） Additional Protocol II, Art 14.
23） Ibid., Art 15.
24） Additional Protocol I, Art 56.
17
Legal Regulation on Protection of Environment in Times of Non-international Armed Conflict:
A Preliminary Study of the Classification of Armed Conflict
 The protection of cultural objects under Article 1625） is considered to prohibit some 
environmental damage in non-international armed conflict. Nevertheless, the environment 
is only protected to the extent that it is, or forms part of, a cultural or historic place. 
Moreover, there are two provisions of interest in the protection of civilians: Article 1326） 
on the protection of the civilian population and Article 1727） on the prohibition of forced 
movement of civilians. Where the environment is destroyed with the aim of forcibly 
moving a civilian population, this could amount to a violation of Article 17.
 Unfortunately, according to the scope of the Additional Protocol II, a non-international 
armed conflict has to meet high threshold requirements. Article 1(1) lays down an 
additional condition to the ones already present in Common Article 3: dissident armed 
forces or other organized groups have to be under responsible command and exercise 
control of part of the territory. It is difficult to find a non-international conflict meeting all 
of these requirements, as these are set up as cumulative.
2.	Methods	and	Means	of	Warfare	in	Non-International	Armed	Conflict	Limitations
 There is no automatic application of the treaties which control the development and 
use of weapons to non-international armed conflict. Disarmament and weapons treaties are 
not designed specifically to protect the environment; nonetheless, it is possible to discern a 
critical mass of limitations on means of warfare that may apply in non-international armed 
conflict. In terms of this, environmental damage may be prohibited if it is caused by a 
weapon which itself is prohibited, or which is used outside of the bounds of the 
limitations placed upon it.
25） Additional Protocol II, Article 16, reads as follows:
 ‘Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against 
historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of 
peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort.’
26） The relevant provisions of Additional Protocol II, Article 13, are as follows:
 ‘1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising 
from military operations.
 2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.’
27） Additional Protocol II, Article 17, reads as follows:
 ‘1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless 
the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements 
have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be 
received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
 2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.’
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2.1. Biological Weapons Convention
 The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention 28） does not apply expressly to 
non-international armed conflict but may do so as a matter of customary international law. 
By banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, the 
Convention ‘protect[s] the environment in armed conflict from weapons that are likely to 
cause significant environmental degradation, particularly to the natural environment and to 
fauna and flora.’29）
 Article 2 of the Biological Weapons Convention requires each state party, in 
implementing the Convention, to observe all necessary safety precautions to protect 
populations and the environment. Although criticized because of its indeterminate 
language, such as the absence of quantities and parameters to determine when the 
substance is being used for peaceful purposes, which may give a ground for 
circumvention 30）, it does represent a contribution to environmental protection in 
non-international armed conflict.
2.2.	Environmental	Modification	Convention
 The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)31） prohibits the use of environmental 
modification techniques as a method or means of warfare. It was drafted in response to the 
environmental modification techniques, such as cloud seeding and forest defoliation, used 
by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War, that have caused very severe environmental 
harm. This Convention prohibits the use of environmental modification techniques, rather 
than environmental damage in general. Since its adoption in 1976, ENMOD has been 
criticized as being ‘pregnant with limitations’32） to the extent that it has largely been 
irrelevant to most forms of environmental harm arising in the context of armed conflict 33）.
 Article 1 of the Convention does not make the clear distinction between international 
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore, the ENMOD does not 
expressly apply in non-international armed conflict, and the extent to which it has become 
28） Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) (1972) 1015 
UNTS 163.
29） UNEP, supra notes 1, 15.
30） G. D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 607-611.
31） Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151.
32） Phoebe N. Okowa, ‘The Legal Framework for the Protection of Natural Resources in Situations of Armed 
Conflict’ in Willem J.M. Genugten, Michael P. Scharf and Sasha E. Radin (eds), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 
Years After the 1907 Hague Peace Conference: Proceedings of the Eighth Hague Joint Conference held In 
The Hague, The Netherlands, 28-30 June 2007 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2007), 249.
33） Loc. cit.
19
Legal Regulation on Protection of Environment in Times of Non-international Armed Conflict:
A Preliminary Study of the Classification of Armed Conflict
part of customary international law is questionable. Article 1(1) refers to a prohibition on 
states causing damage to other states by means of environmental modification in armed 
conflict. It may not be binding in state versus non-state armed conflict, or at least not 
binding on the non-state party. Article 1(2) of the ENMOD prohibits state parties from 
inducing ‘international organizations’ to engage in environmental modification techniques 
in armed conflict. An annex to the ENMOD, containing clarification of key terms, is silent 
as to the precise nature of the types of international organization envisioned by Article 
1(2), and the extent to which this Convention applies to non-international armed conflict 
remains unclear.
2.3. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its protocols
 The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 34） is expressly applicable to 
all non-international armed conflicts as a result of an amendment to Article 135）. The 
Convention has several protocols, some of which have the potential to lawfully prohibit 
environmental damage caused by the use of prohibited weapons. The preamble to the 
Convention recalls prohibition ‘to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment.’36）
 Protocol V37） on unexploded ordinance requires parties using weapons that fall into 
either category to ‘facilitate substantial restoration to prior environmental conditions’38） and 
‘indirectly protect the environment from post-conflict threats.’39） The preamble to Protocol 
III clearly prohibits targeting the environment with incendiary weapons, unless the 
environment itself under the circumstances is a military objective 40）. Therefore, there is a 
qualified prohibition on environmental damage in Protocol III to the Conventional 
Weapons Convention. It is unclear to what extent non-state actors can be bound by this. 
As the Convention was only made applicable to non-international armed conflict by an 
34） Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21 
December 2001), 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137.
35） Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Amendment 
article 2, 21 December 2001, 1342 UNTS 137.
36） Ibid., Preamble.
37） Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects (Protocol V), Geneva 28 November 2003, 2399 UNTS 100.
38） UNEP, supra notes 1, 15.
39） Loc. cit.
40） Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Geneva, 10 
October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137. Preamble: ‘It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the 
object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or 
camouflage combatants or other military objectives or are themselves military objectives.’
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amendment in 2001, it is difficult to say that the Convention has become customary 
international law.
2.4. Chemical Weapons Convention
 The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 41） ‘prohibits destroying chemical weapons by 
“dumping in any body of water, land burial and open pit burning” thereby ensuring that 
the human and environmental costs of disposal are minimised.’42） The Chemical Weapons 
Convention has an immediate bearing on the protection of the natural environment during 
armed conflict, as chemical substances may have particularly direct and severe impacts on 
the environment 43）. Indeed chemical components of certain material war remnants can have 
harmful effects on humans, animals, vegetation, water, land and the ecosystem as a 
whole 44）.
 However, the extent to which the Convention applies in non-international armed 
conflict is unclear. The text of the Convention does not indicate application in 
non-international armed conflict, though it may apply as customary international law in 
these circumstances.
2.5. Cluster Munitions Convention
 Cluster Munitions have been identified as posing human and environmental risks both 
within conflict and in the post-conflict setting 45）. Concerning the clearance and destruction 
of cluster-munition remnants, Article 4(6)(h) of the Cluster Munitions Convention 46） 
mentions ‘the environment.’ This Convention is silent as to the categories of conflict that it 
applies to, referring only to restrictions prohibiting states party to the convention from 
using cluster munitions ‘under any circumstances.’47） This includes state engagement in 
non-international armed conflict against non-state actors. However, it may not involve a 
reciprocal obligation on non-state armed groups. Having only been adopted in 2008, it is 
unlikely to enter the realm of customary international law and therefore the extent to 
which it can bind non-state actors is questionable.
41） Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3.
42） UNEP, supra notes 1, 15.
43） Loc. cit.
44） Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987), 
411.
45） UNEP, supra notes 1, 16.
46） Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin 30 May 2008, UN Doc C.N.776.2008.
47） Ibid., Art 1(1).
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3. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court
 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute describes a prohibition against launching an 
attack causing ‘widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment that would 
be clearly excessive to […] the military advantage anticipated.’48） However, this article 
does not favorably contribute to the protection of the environment due to its 
inapplicability in times of non-international armed conflicts. Articles 8(2)(c) and (e), 
which name crimes punishable within non-international armed conflicts, do not include 
environmental crimes in the list 49）.
4. Conclusion
 This section began by recognising that the treaty-based laws of non-international armed 
conflict do not have direct provisions prohibiting environmental damage. It has been 
argued that Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and treaties regulating the use of 
certain weapons have potential as instruments to indirectly prohibit environmental damage 
in non-international armed conflict. While Common Article 3 is a fundamental source of 
regulations for non-international armed conflict, it is submitted that it cannot foreseeably 
result in the prohibition of environmental damage outside of very specific and highly 
nuanced circumstances. Additional Protocol II contains several provisions that have the 
potential to prohibit environmental damage in non-international armed conflict. The 
discussion on the Additional Protocol II provisions was divided into those provisions that 
apply to property and those that apply to the protection of civilians.
 As mentioned above, these provisions prohibiting damage to ‘property’ are useful 
options for the protection of the environment in certain circumstances. It is submitted that 
the possible protection of environment under Additional Protocol II is achieved through 
the prohibition against pillage, the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population, the protection of works and installations containing dangerous 
forces, and the protection of cultural objects. Protection of the environment is achieved to 
a much lesser extent in the civilian-protection provisions such as Articles 13 and 17.
 This section also discussed relevant treaties that place limitations on the use of certain 
weapons, means and methods of warfare. In conclusion, limitations on weapons, means 
and methods of warfare can, in some instances, prohibit environmental damage in 
non-international armed conflict. However, the important limitation with these treaties is 
determining their applicability in non-international armed conflict and to non-state armed 
groups, as many of the relevant treaties are silent as to their application. While it is 
48） The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 July 2003), 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Art 8 (2)(b)(iv).
49） For the argument on the interpretation of the definition of non-international armed conflicts in the Rome 
Statute, see Anthony Cullen, “The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in Article 8(2)(f),” 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol.12, No.3 (2008), 421-445.
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worthwhile placing limitations on the use of environmentally harmful weapons, the extent 
to which this is achieved in non-international armed conflict under the current framework 
of treaties in place is questionable. Furthermore, while the Rome Statute has an article 
which regulates environmental harm as a war crime during international armed conflict, no 
equivalent provisions regulating war crimes committed in situations of non-international 
armed conflict exist.
III	Customary	Laws	of	Protection	of	the	Environment	applicable	to	
Non-international	Armed	Conflict
1. Introduction
 The applicability of customary international law to non-international armed conflicts 
has become a ‘general trend’50） in the field of laws of armed conflict. The extension of the 
list of customary law provisions relevant to non-international law is an ongoing process 51）. 
In addition to the protection of the environment during armed conflict provided by the 
references in the conventions discussed above, customary international law also has the 
potential to protect the environment. In general, customary international law compliments 
the positive, treaty-based laws of armed conflict, and as such, all parties to an armed 
conflict must respect the principles of laws of armed conflict such as military necessity, 
proportionality, distinction, and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering.
 It has been said that the customary rules do not apply to non-state actors but only to 
states 52）. Given the issue of methodology for the identification of customary international 
law, customary international law is based on state practice and does not represent 
non-state actors. In terms of the law-creation process, only states are considered as 
relevant subjects, and armed groups are not granted a role to attribute 53）. On the other 
hand, it is suggested that the key factor for the applicability of customary law is whether 
50） Anne Dienelt and Britta Sjöstedt, “Is the ILC‘s Work Enhancing Protection for the Environment in Relation 
to Warfare? A Reply to Stavros-Evdokimos Pantazopoulos and Karen Hulme,” Questions of International 
Law, Vol.34 (2016), 45.
51） Kyo Arai, “Hikokusaiteki buryokuhunso-ni tekiyosareru kokusai-jindoho-no kansyuhokisoku: Sekizyuji 
kokusai-iinkai ‘Kanshu kokusai jindoho’ Kenkyu-no hihanteki kosastu (Customary International Humanitarian 
Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Critical Analysis of the ICRC Study),” The Doshisha Hogaku 
(The Doshisha Law Review), Vol.60, No.7 (2009), 4139-4163.
52） Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 50.
53） Murry pointed out that International courts, such as the International Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Justice, have held that non-state entities are bound by customary international law, without 
commenting on any potential ability of these entities to contribute to the creation of such law. He also argues 
that an armed group only has international legal personality when it is the subject of direct cognition by the 
international legal order. Daragh Murray, “How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State 
Armed Groups,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol.20, No.1 (2015), 108.
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the entity has legal personality or not 54）. In the period after the Second World War, it 
became increasingly accepted that non-state entities can be subjects of international law. 
The ICJ confirmed this view by stating that ‘by their very nature customary law rules and 
obligations must have equal force for all members of the international community.’55） If an 
armed group does possess international legal personality—arising from the treaty-based 
application of common Article 3, for example—it will then be bound by customary 
international law, resulting in the application of the entire body of customary international 
humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict 56）.
 The Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter, the ICRC Study 
on Customary Law) by the ICRC has shown some implications of this law. It has asserted 
that some of the laws of international armed conflict may now apply so as to enhance 
environmental protection in non-international armed conflict 57）. This section will also 
examine the customary laws of armed conflict that have been identified in the ICRC Study 
on Customary Law.
2.	The	principles	of	the	Armed	Conflict	Law	and	the	Protection	of	Environment
2.1.	The	Principle	of	Distinction
 The principle of distinction is ‘the first test to be applied in warfare.’58） Civilians and 
civilian objects can never be deliberately targeted. The ICTY in the Tadić case 59） 
recognized that it was necessary to apply ‘basic humanitarian principles in all armed 
conflict’60） and as such they held that the principle of distinction did apply in 
non-international armed conflict. Nevertheless, as no clear distinction exists between 
combatant and civilian under the laws of non-international armed conflict, the application 
of this principle may be difficult in practice. Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I 
provides:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in 
54） Ibid.
55） ICJ 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Reports 1969, Judgment, para. 63.
56） Murray, op. cit., 109.
57） Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: 
Rules (ICRC ed, Cambridge University Press 2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume II: Practice (ICRC ed, Cambridge University Press, 
2005).
58） UNEP, supra notes 1, 13.
59） Tadić Case, supra notes 13, para 127.
60） UNGA Res 2444 (XXIII), Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Dec. 19, 
1968).
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the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage 61）.
The ICRC study on Customary Law observes that the definition of a military objective 
applies as a matter of custom in both international and non-international armed conflicts 62）. 
Paragraph 40 of the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Conflicts at Sea 63） adopts the same definition of ‘military objectives’ as those of Article 
52(2) of the Additional Protocol I.
 The environment only benefits from the protection of the principle of distinction 
insofar as it qualifies as being a civilian objective. When it becomes a military objective, 
it loses protection under the principle of distinction, and then it may be legitimately 
targeted 64）. Determining whether the environment is a military objective or civilian object 
is a crucial issue in terms of protection of the environment. The assessment of the 
conditions needs to be done regarding the circumstances ruling at the time as there is no 
fixed borderline between civilian objects and military objects.
 Under the test of the principle of precaution in attack, parties to an armed conflict must 
do their utmost to determine that an object is indeed a military objective before attacking. 
Hulme indicates that ‘[o]nce rivers, lakes, and trees are seen as prima facie civilian, they 
are no longer just a valueless part of the scenery in which a battle takes place.’65） While 
there are no clear provisions in the laws of armed conflict that ‘explicitly designate the 
environment as being civilian in nature, this is the prevailing view of the international 
community and undoubtedly the force behind the protection.’66）
 The 2006 San Remo Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict with 
Commentary 67） indicates that it regards the natural environment to be a civilian objective 
by virtue of their nature, location, purpose or use 68）. Indeed, support for this assertion is 
widespread, to the extent that it may be ‘universally accepted that the environment is 
prima facie a civilian object, although terming the environment an object has always 
61） Additional Protocol I, Art 52 (2). Article 19 and Article 4 Annex I of the 1949 Geneva Convention I and 
Article 18 and Article 4 Annex I of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV use the term ‘military objectives’ without, 
however, defining it.
62） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume I: Rules, supra notes 52, Rule 8.
63） Louise Doswald-Beck ed., San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 
12 June 1994, para 40.
64） Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University, 2016), 238.
65） Karen Hulme, “Taking Care to Protect the Environment Against Damage: A Meaningless Obligation?” 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol.92 (2010), 678.
66） Ibid.
67） International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 
with Commentary, San Remo, 2006.
68） Ibid., 59.
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appeared to be a little clumsy.’69） There is a difference between civilian objects under the 
principle of distinction and civilian objects as defined by Article 14 of Additional Protocol 
II. Civilian objects in the context of Article 14 are those objects which would cause 
starvation amongst the civilian population if damaged or destroyed. There is no such 
qualification to the designation of civilian objects under the customary principle of 
distinction.
 Where the natural environment, by reason of its nature, location, purpose or use, makes 
an effective contribution to military action, and the partial or total destruction, capture or 
neutralization of which, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage, it may be considered to be a military objective and as such can be lawfully 
targeted during the conduct of hostilities 70）. In the commentary to Rule 8 of the ICRC 
Study on Customary Law, it is recognised that this rule is ‘a wide one, which includes 
areas of land, objects screening other military objectives and war-supporting economic 
facilities.’71）
 A civilian objective shall be presumed as civilian in case of doubt 72）. When in doubt 
as to civilian or military objective status, parties to the conflict must err on the side of 
caution, and a presumption of civilian protection must prevail 73）. As a military objective, it 
is up to the principles of necessity, proportionality and humanity, as well as treaty-based 
laws of armed conflict, to prohibit environmental damage in non-international armed 
conflicts. While the environment is treated as a dual-use object 74）, it is difficult to apply the 
principle of distinction, as the natural environment will often serve both military and 
civilian uses. In terms of strengthening the protection of the environment, if the 
environment is to be considered a dual-use object, there should be a presumption in favor 
of recognizing the environment as being a civilian object.
2.2.	The	Principle	of	Proportionality
 The principle of proportionality is a fundamental concept in the laws of armed conflict. 
69） Karen Hulme, ‘Natural Environment’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives on the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 209.
70） UNEP has concerns about natural resources becoming military objectives and legitimate targets under the 
principle of distinction. It questions whether an area affected by the illegal exploitation of high-value natural 
resources (whether by rebels, government troops or foreign occupying forces) would be considered an 
acceptable target, considering that revenue from this illegal trade was contributing to the war effort (UNEP, 
supra notes 1, 13).
71） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume I: Rules, supra notes 52, 31.
72） Additional Protocol I, Art. 52 (3).
73） Jann K. Kleffner, “From ‘Belligerents’ to ‘Fighters’ and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities—On 
the Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years After the Second Hague 
Peace Conference,” Netherlands International Law Review, Vol.54 No.2 (2007), 335.
74） Gabriel Swiney, “Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern War,” International 
Lawyer, Vol.39 (2005), 750.
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When attacking military objectives, belligerents must make sure that any collateral 
damage to civilians is not out of proportion to the military advantage anticipated 75）. As 
Hulme indicates, proportionality does not guarantee absolute protection to civilians and 
civilian objects, including the environment, but it has a function of providing a method of 
balancing the values at stake 76）. Nevertheless, the ICRC has identified a sufficient body of 
evidence to indicate that proportionality applies as a matter of custom in non-international 
armed conflicts 77）, even though the principle of proportionality does not appear in any of 
the provisions in Additional Protocol II.
 The extent of the damage that can be caused to the environment depends on how it is 
valued: the greater the value that is placed on the environment, the less the damage that 
can be proportionately caused 78）. The principle of proportionality can prohibit 
disproportionate environmental damage in non-international armed conflicts. The degree to 
which environmental damage is considered to be disproportionate depends on the 
subjective value that is placed on the environment by the military commander or non-state 
armed groups at the time of the attack. It is unlikely that many military commanders or 
non-state armed groups may be able to value the environment appropriately. This 
subjectivity is the very weak point in the proportionality test.
2.3. Military Necessity
 If military necessity is subordinate to the laws of armed conflict, then it can only 
provide exceptions to laws when permitted by that particular law. Environmental damage 
that would otherwise violate laws of armed conflict into which no military-necessity 
exception has been incorporated would not be justified by the customary doctrine of 
military necessity.
 As Hulme argues, the doctrine of military necessity has become a limited one: It is 
meaningful only where sanctioned within the law itself 79）. In this regard, military necessity 
does not significantly undermine existing treaty law, which provides indirect protection to 
the environment in non-international armed conflicts as the treaty-based rules in Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II that have no associated military necessity clause. 
However, military necessity may have some implications for the application of the 
customary laws of armed conflict in non-international armed conflicts.
75） Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005), 417.
76） Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004), 
126.
77） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume I: Rules, supra notes 52, Rule 14; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
Volume II: Practice, supra notes 52, Chapter 4.
78） Michael N. Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare,” Yale Human Rights & 
Development Law Journal, Vol.2 (1999), 151.
79） Hulme, op. cit., 131.
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2.4. The principle of Humanity
 According to the ICRC, in armed conflict, the purpose of the principle of humanity is 
to protect life and health and to ensure respect for human beings. It promotes mutual 
understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples 80）. Thus a 
party cannot use starvation as a method of warfare, or attack, destroy, remove or render 
useless such objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Therefore, the 
principle of humanity could prohibit environmental damage that would ultimately result in 
excessive human suffering.
 The principle of humanity has the potential to prohibit inhumane environmental 
damage in non-international armed conflicts, in cases where environmental damage causes 
unnecessary suffering to animals, flora, fauna or the natural environment as a whole, as 
well as to human beings.
2.5.	Precautions	in	attack
 Precautions in attack describes the obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects from damage, including taking precautions to 
avoid or at the very least minimize incidental damage to same 81）. In terms of protection of 
the environment, minimizing damage through precautions in attack ensures that the natural 
environment does not get harmed to any greater degree than is absolutely necessary 82）. The 
ICRC have commented on this, stating that ‘[e]nvironmental considerations should lead to 
greater weight being given to the medium- and long-term consequences of an attack, 
including the long-term environmental consequences that will affect civilian life after the 
end of hostilities. Furthermore, these provisions point to possible precautionary measures 
that should be considered with a view to minimizing environmental damage per se.’83）
3. ICRC Study on Customary Law
 ICRC Customary Law Study Rules 43, 44 and 45 fall under the heading of customary 
rules protecting the ‘Natural Environment.’ The ICRC indicates that Rules 43 and 45 may 
apply in non-international armed conflicts. Firstly, Rule 43 contains general principles on 
the Conduct of Hostilities which do apply customarily in non-international armed 
conflicts. UNEP argues that this ‘could clarify some of the outstanding questions and, in 
the process, create more definite measures to protect the environment in armed conflict.’84）
Rule 43 as identified by the ICRC states that:
80） André Durand, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, Geneva 1981), 54.
81） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume I: Rules, supra notes 52, 51.
82） Richard Desgagné, “The Prevention of Environmental Damage in Time of Armed Conflict: Proportionality 
and Precautionary Measures”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol.3 (2000), 117.
83） Ibid.
84） UNEP, supra notes 1, 21.
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 The general principles on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural environment:
 A. No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military objective.
 B.  Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless required by 
imperative military necessity.
 C.  Launching an attack against a military objective which may be expected to cause 
incidental damage to the environment which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited 85）.
The environment may only be attacked if it is a military objective, and if it satisfies the 
demands of proportionality. Nonetheless, these rules do apply customarily in 
non-international armed conflicts and to the extent to which the environment is protected 
through these general principles.
 Secondly, ICRC Customary Law Rule 44, entitled ‘Due Regard for the Environment 
in Military Operations,’ states as follows:
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the 
protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military 
operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to 
minimise, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to 
the effects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a 
party to the conflict from taking such precautions 86）.
The obligation to have due regard for the environment is derived from principles of 
precaution in attack. The customary obligation to take precaution in attack requires 
environmental information to be factored into assessments. It also requires precautions to 
be taken to minimise environmental damage during the conduct of hostilities. Due regard 
for the environment could be fulfilled through preparing environmental-impact 
assessments of an attack so that environmental effects can be factored into a 
proportionality test. However, it is difficult to get reliable and valid information on the 
environment within a limited time frame.
 Thirdly, Customary Rule 45 indicates serious damage to the natural environment. Rule 
45 states as follows:
The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is 
prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon 87）.
85） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume I: Rules, supra notes 52, 143.
86） Ibid., 147.
87） Ibid., 151.
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This rule is an amalgamation of Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I. No 
equivalent provisions were included in Additional Protocol II. The ICRC asserts that Rule 
45 applies as a matter of custom to all international armed conflicts and only arguably in 
non-international armed conflicts. However, the evidence presented to support its being a 
rule of customary law has been observed as being rather unconvincing 88）.
 As the threshold requirements of ‘widespread, long-term and serious damage’ have 
been criticized as being inadequate and ineffective, to have these as the standards of 
permissible environmental damage in non-international armed conflicts, one would rarely 
expect any commensurate enhancement of environmental protection. As to the second 
sentence of Rule 45, prohibiting the use of the environment as a weapon in armed 
conflict, the justification provided by the ICRC is unconvincing 89）.
 Finally, Rule 76 of the ICRC’s Study on Customary Law states that
 [t]he use of herbicides as a method of warfare is prohibited if they:
 (a) are of a nature to be prohibited chemical weapons;
 (b) are of a nature to be prohibited biological weapons;
 (c) are aimed at vegetation that is not a military objective;
 (d)  would cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which may be expected to be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; or
 (e)  would cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment 90）.
This rule prohibits the use of herbicides in warfare under certain conditions, though the 
issue of defoliants in armed conflict is clearly the primary reason for the identification of 
this rule. It maintains that herbicides would be prohibited if their composition reached the 
level of chemical or biological weapons 91）. It is identified as being a rule of customary 
international law in non-international armed conflicts. However, the ICRC admits that 
there is ‘less specific practice concerning the use of herbicides in non-international armed 
conflicts.’92）
4. Conclusion
 The customary rules of armed conflict do, in some respects, prohibit environmental 
damage in non-international armed conflicts. However, identifying customary law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts is generally difficult in most cases. This 
88） Dam-de Jong, supra notes 20, 19.
89） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume II: Practice, supra notes 52, 876.
90） Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Volume I: Rules, supra notes 52, 265.
91） Ibid.
92） Ibid., 267.
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section shows that the principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity and humanity 
work, in a certain degree, to protect the environment in non-international armed conflicts. 
Moreover, some of the rules identified by the ICRC as being customary were less 
convincingly shown to apply to non-international armed conflicts and as such their 
enforcement would be dubious in terms of the rule of law.
 Firstly, to the extent that the environment is classified as a civilian object, the principle 
of distinction protects the environment in non-international armed conflicts. The 
environment, as a civilian object, cannot be directly targeted at any time. Where it loses a 
civilian object, the protective shield of civilian exemption from attack is removed. Further 
difficulties arise where the environment has dual military and civilian uses.
 Secondly, the principle of proportionality prohibits environmental damage that is 
excessive in relation to the overall military advantage achieved. The problem is the 
standard of valuing the environment against military targets. It is submitted that the 
principle of proportionality is of greatest use when the environment is highly valued. In 
terms of this, it is quite difficult to expect the high evaluation of the environment by 
non-state armed groups in reality.
 Thirdly, military necessity prohibits environmental damage to the extent that it 
generally prohibits wanton destruction and damage. In other words, the environment may 
not be unnecessarily harmed. Unless there is a military-necessity exception clause to a 
specific provision of the treaty-based laws of armed conflict, then the principle of military 
necessity cannot circumvent or undermine the environmental protection generated from an 
indirect interpretation of treaty provisions.
 Fourthly, it is possible that under certain circumstances, the principle of humanity or 
the prohibition on unnecessary suffering prohibits environmental damage that would 
otherwise be inhumane or cause unnecessary suffering to the human population. It has the 
potential, however, to be quite far-reaching, possibly also prohibiting unnecessary 
suffering caused to animals and the natural environment in general. The manner in which 
this would be applied in practice is unclear.
 In addition, Customary Law Study by the ICRC has asserted several rules that may 
customarily apply in non-international armed conflicts to prohibit environmental damage. 
It was proposed here that the provisions in Rule 45 arguably do not apply in 
non-international armed conflicts. Even if it did, it would be of insignificant effect since 
Article 35(3) has been widely criticized to date as being ineffective, requiring an 
extremely high threshold.
IV Conclusion
 As conflicts increasingly involve non-state entities and have transnational dimensions, 
they also challenge the classification between international and non-international armed 
conflict. However, it is often said that there is a huge gap between the applicable norms in 
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international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. In light of some recent 
evolutions, the imbalance in regulations between non-international armed conflicts and 
international armed conflicts has been partially reduced. The applicability of customary 
rules fills the existing gap between non-international armed conflict and international 
armed conflict. As treaties contain articles concerning non-international armed conflict, it 
may expand the normative framework.
 There are some provisions of the treaty-based laws of non-international armed conflict 
that are promising in terms of the indirect prohibition on environmental damage that they 
may represent. These rules may be ensuring a minimal level of protection. However, the 
discussion above has identified a number of important limitations to this approach. 
Customary international law is surrounded by ‘mystery and uncertainty,’93） thus bringing 
more uncertainty especially in the context of non-international armed conflict.
 Taking into account the above analysis, in the current legal situation, regulating the 
environmental harm in non-international armed conflicts is more difficult in terms of 
environmental protection. Treaty-based laws which regulate non-international armed 
conflicts, such as Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, do not have any provisions which provide adequate protection of the 
environment. Concern for the quality of the environment is reflected in article 54 of 
Additional Protocol I and article 14 of Additional Protocol II, which prohibit damage to 
the natural environment that is indispensable for the survival of the local population. 
However, these provisions do not fundamentally aim at protecting the environment.
 International customary law is expected to complement the lack of legal norms in 
non-international armed conflicts. It is clear that the fundamental principles, such as the 
principle of distinction and the principle of humanity, reflect customary law and are 
applicable in all types of armed conflict. These principles may provide protection of the 
environment in certain circumstances. However, there are difficulties in relying on the 
customary laws of armed conflict. As Tarasofsky indicates, it is difficult to provide 
sufficient guidance to a military commander because of the uncertainties of customary 
international laws 94）.
 However, the international community is trying to change the current situation so as 
to provide sufficient environmental protection during non-international armed conflict. ILC 
put the topic “Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts” on its 
program of work at its sixty-fifth session in 201395）. The inclusion of this topic on the 
93） Erik Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment during International 
Armed Conflict (Hart Publishing, 2008), 214.
94） Richard G. Tarasofsky, “Protecting Specially Important Areas During International Armed Conflict: A 
Critique of the IUCN Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Hostile Military Activities in Protected Areas” 
in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and 
Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2000), 568.
95） International Law Commission, Report on its Sixty-Fifth Session (6 May to 7 June and 8 July to 9 August 
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agenda of the ILC, as well as UN Environment Assembly Resolution 15 in May 201696）, 
indicates that the international community is willing to enhance the protection of the 
environment in relation to armed conflict.
 It is interesting to note that the recent work of the ILC is emphasizing the needs of 
regulating environmental consequences during non-international armed conflict 97）. The ILC 
has not made any differentiation between armed conflict of an international character and 
armed conflict of a non-international character in the text of the provisionally adopted 
draft principles. The ILC’s work on this topic is not yet concluded, and several 
commissioners have expressed a desire for the issues of environmental damage caused in 
non-international armed conflicts to be addressed in this project 98）. Some of the committee 
members express their reluctance at the ILC’s work’s including non-international armed 
conflicts in this project. This approach had received considerable critical attention and 
raised concerns about the status of the draft principles that will be included in the final 
text, given that the law of non-international armed conflict is under-developed in 
comparison to the law of international armed conflict 99）. As Pantazopoulos evaluates, in 
terms of the classification of armed conflict, the position adopted by the ILC as 
‘progressive’100）—that is, regulating environmental harm by the common principle—is 
somehow challenging.
 Given that these issues about non-international armed conflict are of particular 
importance to protecting the environment, they are worth keeping in mind in future 
discussion. To regulate the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflict, many 
legal challenges arise. Achieving sufficient protection of the environment in relation to 
non-international armed conflict requires capturing the more complex reality of armed 
conflict and further elaboration of legal norms, such as questions on implementation and 
enforcement, as well as the responsibility and practice of non-state actors and organized 
armed groups in non-international armed conflict related to environmental harm. This is 
2013), UN Doc. A/68/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Volume II, Part Two (2013), para 
19.
96） UN Environment Assembly of the UN Environment Programme Resolution 2/15 of 27 May 2016, 
“Protection of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed Conflict,” UN Doc. UNEP/EA. 2/Res. 15, 4 
August 2016.
97） A/71/10, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventy-first Session, Supplement No.10 (A/71/10), 
Chapter X, Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict, C. Text of the draft principles on 
protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict provisionally adopted so far by the Commission, 
Commentary to Draft principle 1, para. 3.
98） Ibid., paras 166 and 178.
99） Belarus (A/C.6/69/SR.26, para. 28); Iran (Islamic Republic of) (A/C.6/69/SR.27, para. 13); statement by 
Spain to the Sixth Committee, sixty-ninth session, 3 November 2014; and statement by France to the Sixth 
Committee, sixty-ninth session, 29 October 2014.
100）  Stavros-Evdokimos Pantazopoulos, “Protection of the environment during armed conflicts: An appraisal 
of the ILC’s work,” Questions of International Law, Vol.34 (2016), 10.
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particularly true for the problem of ensuring the effectiveness of the existing body of 
international law.
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